Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials by Keefe, Eugene J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 2 Article 11 
1943 
Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials 
Eugene J. Keefe 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eugene J. Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 Fordham L. Rev. 130 (1943). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol12/iss2/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
EUGENE J. KEEFEf
THE rapid increase of our administrative agencies, both numerically'
and in scope of subject matter covered,2 brings expanding interest to
the question of the personal liability of the lone administrator or the indi-
vidual members of an administrative board. It is proposed in this paper
to discuss their personal liability from a tortious point of view. The ques-
tions arising out of the problem of the liability of the state or municipality
and the question of personal contractual liability are outside the purview
of this paper.
The courts have established certain principles which seem simple when
applied to ordinary factual set-ups which come to mind immediately upon
the statement of the principles themselves. But when life itself casts up
situations less tailor-made for enclosure within these principles, difficult
problems are presented and the application of the principles seems to
have been dictated by unstated realistic considerations.
It might be well to start with judicial officers. By judicial officers is
meant judges sitting in the actual judicial courts as distinguished from
quasi-judicial officers functioning as administrative agencies. Judicial
officers are immune from personal liability for acts done in their judicial
capacity, even though malice or corruption be shown.' This rule has been
generally4 accepted ' and it carries its absolute immunity from the court
of last resort to the inferior courts.' At an early stage in the development
of the law on the liability of quasi-judicial officers there appeared a ten-
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. The Office of Price Administration; the Office of War Information; the Food Ad-
ministrator.
2. The increase in the scope of activities in the Office of Price Administration and
in the Securities Exchange Commission is typical of the new fields covered by new admin-
istrative agencies.
3. Chancellor Kent in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 and 298 (N. Y. 1810)
refers to the "doctrine which holds a judge exempt from civil suit or indictment, for any
act done, or omitted to be done, by him".
4. But see Murray v. Brancato, 290 N. Y. 52 (1943) discussed infra 193.
5. Chancellor Kent (su pra note 3) referred to the rule as a "sacred principle" with a
"deep root in the common law."
6. In Weavei v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117, 120 (N. Y. 1846) the court wrote: "The rule
ektends to judges from the highest to the lowest, to jurors, and to all public officers,
whatever name they may bear, in the exercise of judicial power."
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dency to grant to them the same absolute immunity.' This has been
manifested in comparatively recent cases.' But the later trend' has been
to impose liability upon quasi-judicial officers where malice or corruption
has been shown.10
Should our quasi-judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity despite
negligence," despite malice or corruption? 12 This paper contemplates the
breaking down of this problem by segregating the cases into groups and
comparing these groups. But before this analysis is started a brief
statement of the considerations material to liability or immunity might
be helpful. The arguments in favor of absolute immunity are (1) the
need of independent officers who can make decisions unhampered by the
threat of law suits," (2) the fear that responsible, capable men would
not accept public office because of the threat of personal liability,"4 (3) the
fear that constant suits would greatly hamper the officer's efficiency,'5
in that he would spend more time in the court room than he would attend-
ing to his administrative duties, (4) the unfairness of imposing liability be-
cause of the practical inability of officers to supervise all work in detail, and
a necessary reliance on subordinates, 6 (5) the contention that a quasi-
judicial officer owes a duty to the public only and not to any individ-
ual, ' 7 (6) the unfairness of asking a quasi-judicial officer to decide an
issue between contestants and then to hold him liable for mistake of judg-
ment'8 and (7) the delay involved in giving such an action, necessitating
the retrial of issues. The arguments in favor of imposing conditional
liability upon quasi-judicial officers would seem to be (1) the dangerous
7. See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers (1937) 21 iMW. L. REV. 263.
8: Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Brightman, 53 F. (2d) 161, 165-6 (1931); Keifer v. Smith,
103 Ieb. 675, 677, 173 N. W. 685 (1919); Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn.
345, 348, 201 N. W. 435, 436 (1925).
9. See Jennings, loc. cit. supra, note 7.
10. This rule in its first development seems to have been in dicta form. See Logan City
v. Alien, 86 Utah, 375, 380, 44 Pac. (2d) 1085, 1087 (1935) where the court denied
liability in the absence of corrupt or malicious motives; State ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers
State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S. W. (2d) 281, 282 (1931).
11. Dunbar v. Faut, 170 S. C. 414, 170 S. E. 460 (1913).
12. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135 (App. D. C. 1938).
13. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (U. S. 1871); (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1344.
14. Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. (2d) 168 (App. D. C. 1927).
15. Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1895).
16. Malewicke v. Svale, 198 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). See Trapani, Liability of
Public Officials for the Defaults of Their Subordinates (1939) 13 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 351.




possibilities inherent in absolute immunity, (2) the unfavorable public
reaction to an application of the rule of absolute immunity in cases, not
where the liability depended upon negligence alone, but where malice,
corruption or dishonesty could be shown and (3) the injustice to the
private citizen or corporation adversely affected. A reasonably careful
reading of the arguments in favor of absolute immunity will indicate
that the rule should be applied in the face of dishonesty, corruption or
malice. Even the above stated argument that the quasi-judicial officer
owes no duty to individuals would seem to permit of immunity where
dishonesty, corruption or malice is shown. For this reason it is the
general rule today that the quasi-judicial officer enjoys only qualified
immunity, which does not excuse him where dishonesty, corruption or
malice is shown.'9 But in some instances liability is not imposed even
if malice is shown.2° The cases cited together with several others will
be discussed in the first part of this article.2 ' The related problem of the
liability of ministerial officers will also be referred to in this part. The
second part will.be devoted to a brief discussion of the liability of admin-
istrative officers for the acts of their subordinates.
I.
Ministerial and quasi-judicial function-non-existence of jurisdic-
tional fact-negligent mistake-malice-absolute liability.
There would seem to be four possible stages of liability of adminis-
trative officers (1) absolute liability,22 (2) liability dependent upon negli-
gence alone,23 (3) liability requiring dishonesty or malice and 24 (4) abso-
lute immunity.25 The last stage is primarily extended to actual judges
19. Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Nev. 97, 249 N. W. 98 (1933); Deatsch v. Fairfield,
37 Ariz. 387, 233 Pac. 887 (1925).
20. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 160, 131 AtI. 155 (1925); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.
(2d) 135 (App. D. C. 1938).
21. In England the liability has been limited to some extent by statute. See The Public
Authorities Protection Act (1893) 5, 6 & 7 VICT. c. 61, which provides that any action
commenced "against any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution . . . of any
Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority" must be commenced within six
months next after the act charged.
22. Bird v. McGoldrick, 277 N. Y. 492, 14 N. E. (2d) 805 (1938); Stanelevitz v. City
of New York, 173 Misc. 5, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 837 (City Ct. 1929).
23. Rochester White Lead Co. v. City of Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463 (1850); National Bank
v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933); Fidelity Deposit Co. v. Cone, et al., 138 Fla.
804, 190 So. 268 (1939).
24. Deatsch v. Fairfield, 27 Ariz. 387, 233 Pac. 887 (1925).
25. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N. Y. 1810).
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in the exercise of judicial functions; and in so far as it relates to
them the discussion will be confined to that appearing in the above
introductory statement.
(1) Absolute liability. There are some instances wherein the law has
imposed absolute liability against administrative officers. In Bird v.
McGoldrick,2" a chief clerk of a court was held liable for the loss of
public funds received in his office where no fault, negligence or dishonesty
on his part was shownY.2  In Stanelevitz v. City of New York, et al,s3
a city chamberlain was held liable for the improper investment of funds
received in his office, where the actual investing was done by a sub-
ordinate in the office, without the knowledge or fault of the defendant. 9
This rule of absolute liability against a public officer for public funds
received by him is based upon three reasons (1) public policy, (2) con-
struction of the statute creating his office and (3) the provision of his
bond.30 The majority rule is carried to the extent of imposing liability
against the officer where he deposits public funds in a bank which sub-
subsequently fails,3 although there are some states, namely Iowa,32
Kentucky,33 Montana,"- Pennsylvania, 5 South Carolina," Tennessee 7
and Wyoming 8 which reject the majority rule and refuse to impose abso-
lute liability where there is no evidence of negligence in the selection of
the bank. In other states the matter is covered by "depository laws",
which relieve officers from liability if they have complied with certain
26. Note 23, supra.
27. In this case, Bird v. McGoldrick, 277 N. Y. 492, 14 N. E. (2d) 805, the court
wrote at 499, 14 N. E. (2d) at 807: "The judicial rule of liability, without fault, for loss
of public funds received by an officer, even if unduly harsh, is too well established to be
changed by the courts."
28. Note 23, supra.
29. In Stanelevitz v. City of New York, 173 Misc. 5, 13, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 837, 844-
845, the court wrote, "Yet the rule of strict liability for moneys received by public officials
seems strongly ingrained in our law."
30. See cases collected and discussed in note (1943) A. L. R. 819.
31. Tillinghost v. Merrill, 151 N. Y. 135, 45 N. E. 375 (1896).
32. Danbury v. Reidmiller, 208 Iowa 879, 226 N. W. 159 (1929).
33. Jordan v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933).
34. Livingston v. Woods, 20 Mont. 91, 49 Pac. 437 (1897).
35. Comm. v. Bailey, 129 Pa. St. Rep. 480, 10 Atl. 764 (1887), but see School District
v. Stoner, 16 Montg. Co. Law Rep. 107 (Pa. 1V00).
36. York County v. Watson, 15 S. C. 1 (1880).
37. Overton County v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34 S. W. 427 (1896).
38. State v. Gramm, 7 Wyo. 329, 52 Pac. 533 (1898).
1943] S133
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
statutory specifications in making the deposit.39 In some states such
statutes have been held unconstitutional sometimes upon the fundamental
ground that they took away a vested property right without due process
of law,4" but more frequently because of some special provision in state
constitutions. 41
(2) Liability dependent upon negligence alone. Those cases wherein
liability is imposed for negligence of the officer alone are instances where-
in he was performing a ministerial function as distinguished from a dis-
cretionary or quasi-judicial function. 2 The rule seems to be well settled
that mere negligence as distinguished from dishonesty or malice is sufficient
to impose liability in cases involving a ministerial duty only,43 but it is
difficult to foretell from decided cases whether a court will hold a par-
ticular function ministerial or discretionary 44 under certain situations. In
most states a finding by state bank department officers that a bank is
insolvent or that there is dishonesty in the conducting of the affairs
of the bank is a discretionary matter.4 But in Idaho this function has
been held ministerial and liability imposed for mere negligence. 6
The Idaho cases may be explained by (a) the courts' recognition of the
importance of public confidence in the state banks or (b) the wording
of the Idaho statute on this matter: "The Bank Commissioner is hereby
authorized, and it is his duty to take charge of such [insolvent] bank or
trust company. . . .," The affirmative imposition of a duty in this direct
language Was considered by the court" a sufficient basis for holding that
39. See Pearson v. State, 56 Ark. 148, 19 S. W. 499 (1892), wherein such a statute
was held constitutional.
40. For example, see Bauer v. North Arkansas Highway, 168 Ark. 220, 270 S. W.
533 (1925).
41. Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123 (1876).
42. Luckie v. Goddard, 171 Misc. 774, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 808 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
43. See Comment, Tort Liability, Ministerial Duty (1933) 8 INDIANA L. J. 333; Garff v.
Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac. 772 (1906) ; State v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 26 Idaho 652,
145 Pac. 1097 (1914); State v. T. G. & S. Co., 27 Idaho 752, 152 Pac. 189 (1915); Walker
v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 252 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Fidelity & Deposit Co.
of Maryland v. Cone, 138 Fla. 804, 190 So. 268 (1939); Bankhead v. Howe, 56 Ariz. 257,
107 Pac. (2d) 198 (1940); See note (1941) 131 A. L. R. 275 and 22 R. C. L. 483.
44. See note 43 supra.
45. Deatsch v. Fairfield, 27 Ariz. 387, 233 Pac. 887 (1925); Dunbar v. Fant, 170 S. C.
414, 170 S. E. 460 (1933).
46. State v. American Surety Co. of New York, 26 Idaho 652, 145 Pac. (1914);
State v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co. of Scranton, Pa., 27 Idaho 752, 152 Pac. 189 (1915).
47. Idaho Laws 1911, c. 124, § 74.
48. See note 46 supra.
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the banking commissioner was performing a ministerial duty in spite of
the obvious discretionary area in first deciding whether the bank was
insolvent. The mere fact that permissive, as distinguished from manda-
tory, language is used in the statute does not change the function to a
discretionary one where it is of a ministerial kind.49 Of course where
the duty to see that certain non-discretionary statutory prerequisites, such
as the duty to prevent the issuance of permission to float securities or
evidence of indebtedness until certain financial safeguards have been
taken is affirmatively imposed, the officer's failure to enforce compliance
through neglect renders him personally liable. 0
The distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions is not
similar to the distinction between acts which are quasi-judicial and those
which are executive.51 Several executive acts require discretion, cannot
be classified as ministerial and hence mere negligence in their perform-
ance would not -impose liability. Probably the best test in detecting
the discretionary function is: Must the officer consider and arrive at a
conclusion? In other words, is he called upon to "pass upon evidence
and decide"?52 There are numerous statements attempting to define
that which is merely ministerial, but probably the best appears in Kendall
v. United States,"3 wherein the court wrote: 5 4 ". . . he [Postmaster Gen-
49. Ables v. State, 79 Okla. 282, 193 Pac. 969 (1920) wherein the court held that the
"'usual rule" that permissive language appearing in a statute imposing duty upon a public
officer is construed as imposing an absolute duty is merely a rule of construction deemed
in accord with legislative intent. Where the legislative intent is contrary, as where the
legislature uses "must" where it means to be mandatory in one section of a statute, the
use of "may" in the same section would indicate a merely permissive intent and it should
be so construed.
So. First Nat. Bank of Key West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933); In Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Cone, 138 Fla. 804, 808, 190 So. 268, 271-2, the court wrote,
"'The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be
done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to
respond in damages' (Amy v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 1361 .... The duty to comply with the
indispensable legal formalities required to be observed in the issuance of public securities
and evidences of indebtedness in order to make them valid and bind the corporate body...
so issuing is ministerial and non-discretionary in character."
51. The generally accepted test as to whether the administrative order follows a quasi-
judicial function is-Does the order bind only those who are parties to the proceed-
ings-if so it is a quasi-judicial act. However, if the order is binding upon all within its
purview it is executive or quasi-legislative.
52.- Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 160, 131 AUt. 155 (1925) where the court applied the
test,-did the administrative officer "pass upon evidence and decide".
53. 12 Pet. 524 (U. S. 1838).
54. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 614 (U. S. 1838).
19431
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eral] was simply required to give the credit.... there is no room for the
exercise of any discretion, official or otherwise; all that is shut out by
the direct or positive command of the law, and the act required to be
done is, in every just sense, a mere ministerial act."55 In some cases the
courts have looked not so much to the character of the immediate act
as to the scope of the general duties of the officer in question.56 Under
this approach the mere necessity on the part of a ministerial officer to use
some judgment or discretion does not convert him into a judicial officer. 57
The following officers have been held to be ministerial officers, more from
the general character of their duties than from an analytic consideration
of the particular acts involved in the immediate cases, constables,"'
sheriffs,"9 county attorneys, 60 county auditors, 61 county treasurers,
6 2
election officers,63 members of a school board,64 superintendents of
schools,"5 treasurers of school districts,66 registrars of deeds67 and officers
directed to issue patents in the said Office of the United States.6" It is
somewhat difficult to reconcile the application of this rule in the cases
involving county attorneys and superintendefits of schools. The nature
of their work generally involves some discretion, but these decisions
while mentioning this approach actually involved only ministerial acts in
the particular cases.
(3) Liability requiring dishonesty or malice. In the cases involving
discretionary or quasi-judicial administrative functions are contained
55. Tennyson may have given us the ultimate test:
"Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do or die."
TENNYsoN, The Charge of the Light Brigade.
56. State v. Loechner, 65 Neb. 814, 91 N. W. 874 (1902); People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. 124,
92 N. E. 607 (1910).
57. See note 56 supra.
58. Commonwealth for Lee v. O'Cull, 7 J. J. Marshall 149; 23 Am. Dec. 393 (1832).
59. See authorities collected in 24 R. C. L. 912.
60. See note 56 supra.
61. Bloomfield Democrat Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Greene County, 93 Lid.
App. 226, 177 N. E. 361 (1931).
62. State ex rel. Jordan v. Quible, 86 Neb. 417, 125 N. W. 619 (1910).
63. See 18 Am. Juris. 204 for discussion and collection of authorities.
64. See note 57 supra.
65. Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N. E. 197 (1886).
66. School Dist. v. Shinn, 61 N. D. 160, 237 N. W. 693 (1931).
67. Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 121 N. W. 616 (1909).
68. Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 271 (1886).
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statements of generally accepted principles, but in the application of these
principles the ultimate decisions seem to be in chaotic confusion. This
type of statement appears: "Where an officer is vested with discretion
and is empowered to exercise his judgment . . . he is sometimes called
a quasi-judicial officer and ... he is usually given immunity... provided
the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority
and without wilfulness; malice or corruption."'6 9 Not infrequently, the
sweeping type of statement is made, such as: "All the authorities agree
that a public officer, acting judicially or in a quasi judicial capacity, cannot
be made personally liable in a civil action, unless the act complained of
be wilful, corrupt or malicious, or without the jurisdiction. of the officer. 7 °
Any attempt to sustain these statements as universally true major prem-
ises would be chauvinistic. The courts have either ingenuously71 avoided
them or disingenuously ignored 71 them and in so doing have by and large
arrived at sagacious decisions.73 The decisions have in most instances
been founded upon broad range corisiderations7 4 rather than concerning
themselves with justice in the immediate case. In many instances the
courts seem to have been influenced by unstated realistic approaches,7 5
such as the effect of their decision upon an officer's conduct in protecting
public health,76 in enforcing the criminal law,7 7 in sustaining public con-
fidence in the soundness of financial institutions78 and in the trustworthi-
ness of public officials. 70
The two predominant antithetical considerations are the right to com-
pensatory damages of the citizen or corporation for the wrong done and
the interest of the public in having its protective laws enforced. In some
instances the courts have gone to the extent of holding that a mere mistake
of fact is sufficient to impose liability 0 and in other decisions there appear
69. Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97. 108, 249 N. W. 98, 104 (1933). Italics added.
*70. Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 105, 86 Pac. 772, 773 (1906). Italics added.
71. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891) ; State ex rel. Davern v. Rose,
140 Wis. 360, 122 N. W. 751 (1909).
72. Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854 (1891).
73. Morrill County v. Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N. W. 98 (1933).
74. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 At. 155 (1925).
75. Ibid.; Rehmann v. City of Des Moines, 204 Iowa 798, 215 N. W. 957 (1927).
76. Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac. 772 (1906).
77. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135 (App. D. C., 1938).
78. Dunbar v. Faut, 170 S. C. 414, 170 S. E. 460 (1933).
79. Bird v. McGoldrick, 277 N. Y. 492, 14 N. E. (2d) 805 (1938).
80. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100; Newark & S. 0. H. R. Co. v. Hunt,
S0 N. J. Law 308, 12 AtI. 697 (1888); Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 74 N. W. 111 (1898);
Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904).
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directly contrary holdings, even to the extent of taking the position that
the citizen or corporation has no right against the public officer, since
the officer owes a duty only to the public." Other courts have refused
to find a cause of action even where malice is alleged upon the ground that
to hamper the public officer with the fear of civil liability would cool his
zeal in the performance of his duty. The court denied the plaintiff
a cause of action expressly upon this ground in Cooper v. O'Connor2 when
it wrote: 83 "Hence the officer is entitled to the protection which the law
throws about him, not because the law is concerned with his personal im-
munity, but because such immunity tends to insure zealous and fearless
administration of the law." In writing this statement the court recognized
the existence of malice in the case,84 and expressly referred to "the fact
that an overzealous or unprincipled officer may get a personal pleasure
out of the suffering of a criminal is not sufficient to offset the interest of
all the people in having the criminal brought to justice."85
The difference in results obtained under the stated rule that a quasi-
judicial officer is not liable where he aits within his jurisdiction, unless
malice or corruption is shown, is interesting. Can the apparently conflict-
ing decisions be explained upon the basis of immediate action by the
officer, being necessary in some cases for the protection of the general
public, and consequent immunity to the officer in order to encourage zeal?
Or is liability imposed because action was taken by the officer without
a hearing? Or is liability imposed against the officer because this is the
only remedy available to the party suffering the loss?
It is apparent from this brief discussion of general excerpts taken from
the cases that a more satisfactory treatment might result from dividing
the cases into groups according to the type of work done by the adminis-
trative agent involved. It is therefore proposed to take some illustra-
81. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 At. 155; Rehrman v. City of Des Moines, 204
Iowa 798, 215 N. W. 957. In Sweeney v. Young, the court wrote, 82 N. H. at 165, 131 At.
at 157: "The duty is public in character and the parties affected ordinarily have no per-
sonal rights against the members composing the judicial body." Again the court wrote, id.
at 167, 131 AtI. at 158: "Since the plaintiff's dismissal is to be here treated as violating none
of his rights, it follows that the manner or means by which the dismissal was brought and
the reasons for it were not injurious."
82. 99 F. (2d) 135 (App. D. C., 1938).
83. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 140: "... it is now generally recognized that, as applied to some officers at
least, even the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice or other bacL motive
are not sufficient to impose liability upon such an officer who acts within the general scope
of his authority."
85. Id. at 140.
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tions from each of the following types of cases and attempt to canalize
through the approaches which will be suggested: (1) Control over dis-
eased animals; (2) Banking control; (3) School supervision; (4) En-
forcement of criminal law.
1. Control over diseased animals. In Miller v. Horton,86 the officer
was held liable for killing a horse under the mistaken idea that the animal
was suffering from glanders. The mistake was honestly made. The de-
fendant acted under a Massachusetts statute which provided that "in
all cases of farcy or glanders, the commissioners having condemned the
animal infected therewith, shall cause such animal to be killed." In
Houston v. State, 7 the court in holding the state not liable wrote,88 "The
statute only authorized the destruction of animals in case they were
affected with some 'contagious or infectious disease of malignant or very
fatal nature' . . . Unless the animals were so diseased in fact, their
slaughter was without authority of law, and hence tortious." The animals
destroyed were cows, mistakenly supposed to be tubercular. In Lowe v.
Conroy89 a health officer was held liable for destroying the hide and beef
of a dead steer which he supposed had died of anthrax. It had not been
afflicted with any dangerous or infectious disease. In Pearson v. Zehr,90
the defendants, live stock commissioners, were held liable for killing
horses, believed to be suffering from a contagious or infectious disease,
under a statute authorizing destruction when such a disease existed. The
horses destroyed were not afflicted with any disease.
In each of these cases liability was imposed without proof of malice or
corruption and despite the fact that the mistake was honestly made.
These Cases exemplify the application of the "jurisdictional fact" doc-
trine, under which the officer is found liable if the fundamental fact re-
quired by the terminology of the statute is non-existent, even though he
honestly believed it to exist. The animals destroyed were not in fact
afflicted with the disease referred to in the authorizing statute. In Stevens
v. Black,91 a member of a veterinary board was held liable for causing
the death of a heavy stallion by recklessly exercising it. The empowering
86. 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891). See Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N. Y. 493, 116
N. E. 355 (1917).
87. 98 Wis. 481, 74 N. W. 111 (1898).
88. Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 483, 74 N. W. 111, 113 (1898).
89. 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904). But see Garff v. Smith, 31 Utah 102, 86 Pac.
772 (1906).
90. 138 Il1. 48, 29 N. E. 854 (1891); See Barret v. City of Mobile, 129 Ala. 179, 30
So. 36 (1900).
91. 212 Mich. 281, 180 N. W. 503 (1920).
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statute provided that "every stallion brought into the state . . for sale
or public service shall be examined by the state veterinary board." The
officer was acting beyond his jurisdiction in examining the horse because
there was no indication that it had been brought into the state for "sale
or public service". A fundamental jurisdictional fact was lacking when
the officer acted. Suppose the stallion had been brought into the state
for the purpose of "sale or public service", would the officer have been
liable for so negligently exercising it as to cause its death? Since in that
case the officer had jurisdiction and had acted without malice or corrup-
tion, it would seem that no liability would be imposed, the officer being
a quasi-judicial one.
The "jurisdictional fact" rule seems harsh when it results in personal
liability being visited upon a conscientious officer acting under an honest
mistake. Yet the citizen has been deprived of his property summarily 2
and without fault upon his part. As between the two immediate parties,
the equities are with the citizen, since the culpability, however slight,
rests upon the officer. However, broad considerations of policy place some
doubt upon the wisdom of a sweeping acceptance of the rule. When the
statute creating the office in which the officer functions has the protection
of the public health as its main objective, it certainly is not in furtherance
of that-purpose for our courts to hamper the protective activities of the
officer with the fear of personal liability based upon a mistake of judg-
ment, however honestly made. When the statute relates to the destruction
of a diseased cow, sheep or pig or other source of food for human con-
sumption the zeal of the officer should be encouraged. When the statute
relates to animals, offering no common satiation of the carnivorous appe-
tites in humans, the danger to public health is present in a much lesser
degree. Such statutes, for instance, as those authorizing the destruction
of horses afflicted with farcy, glanders or anthrax, seem to have for their
main purpose the protection of horses from the further spread of the dis-
ease. Zeal on the part of the officer would seem less important in these
cases. This distinction has been recognized. 93 Where food for human
consumption is involved, the officer, in the performance of his duty, should
be unhampered by fears of possible civil liability.94 In the food cases,
the comparable damage caused by mistaken action is so infinitesimally
small compared with mistaken inaction by the officer, it would seem that
one of three things might be done: (1) Change the rule by statutably
92. North American Cold Storage v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).




granting immunity; but that remedy opens the door to possible corrupt,
unscrupulous or arbitrary action. (2) Amend existing statutes, so that
immunity will be granted if the officer honestly believes9 5 the disease ex-
isted, instead of requiring the actual presence of the disease for immunity.
(3) A statute might guarantee reimbursement by the state to the officer
where he acted under an honest mistake, as has been provided in the
Federal income tax law.96 If healthy animals are to be destroyed under
mistaken statutory jurisdiction for the protection of public health, the
state should reimburse the citizen as it does in eminent domain matters,
rather than cast liability upon conscientious officers. The statute in pre-
scribing the "honest belief" test might distinguish between diseases which
are clearly symptomatic and those which are not. Let us now proceed to
the banking cases and note quite a different result.
(2) Banking control. In the control over diseased animals, the im.
munity to an officer exercising a discretionary or quasi-judicial function
is not extended to his erroneous decisions upon the existence of a "juris-
dictional fact." Is such a restriction upon this immunity to be found in
the banking control cases? In Deatsch v. Fairfield,7 the action was
brought by depositors and their assignees of a bank against the state
bank comptroller for allegedly permitting a bank to remain open after
insolvency. The court, in holding the defendant not liable, wrote:
"Unquestionably officers guilty of doing such a thing (permitting a
bank to continue to transact business, knowing it to be insolvent) would
be liable ... but officers who honestly and in good faith examine a bank's
assets and arrive at the conclusion that it is not insolvent and permit it
to continue to transact business are not liable ... if it later develops that
such institution was in fact insolvent." In Dunbar v. Faut,9 s the court
held the defendant, bank examiner, not liable under a statute which pro-
vided that he should take over a bank and put in a receiver, wherever he
might "find" insolvency, and after he had complied with other statutory
requisites. The court held that he was not liable for mere negligence
95. State ex rel. Davern v. Rose, 140 Wis. 360, 363, 122 N. W. 751, 753 (1909), wherein
the court wrote: ". . . no wrong in the legal sense results when one receives all that the law
accords him. So, when the only right of an individual or the public which the law gives
is that which a designated officer deems best, the honest decision of that officer is the
measure of the right, . .."
96. 53 Stat. 464 (1940), 26 U. S. C. A. § 3770 (b 1 and 2); N. Y. Agriculture and
Markets Law §§ 87-88.
97. 27 Ariz. 387, 394, 233 Pac. 887, 894 (1925); See Sanders State Bank v. Hawkins,
142 S. W. 84 (Tex. 1911).
98. 170 S. C. 414, 170 S. E. 460 (1913).
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in failing to act, that it must be shown that "he was guilty of corruption,
or bad faith, or was influenced by malicious motives." These two cases
illustrate the great weight of authority9 in the matter of banking control.
Under this class of cases, the rule of immunity enjoyed by public officials
charged with the supervision of banks embraces findings by him on the
"jurisdictional fact" of insolvency, unless malice or corruption is shown.
If he was honestly mistaken he is clothed with judicial protection.1 °
How are these banking cases to be distinguished from the diseased ani-
mal cases? Is there less administrative discretion involved in finding the
jurisdictional facts in the diseased animal cases? It would seem just as
difficult to ascertain the existence of symptoms of a disease without
the benefits of verbal respoxises as it is to ascertain symptoms of in-
solvency. Does the fact that liability is imposed because of commission
in the animal cases and for omission in the banking cases form a basis of
distinction? Where this distinction between acts of commission and omis-
sion is recognized in the law of negligence and liability against a defend-
ant is denied for mere omission, it is because no duty to act is present.
But in the administrative situations the statutes, at least impliedly,
create a duty on the officials to act where the required facts are present.
Is this immunity in the banking cases where good faith is present granted
to discourage hasty action by the public officer because of the dangerous
public reaction to one bank's seizure? It might cause a "run" upon
banks generally in the district. This is undeniably a practical considera-
tion. Probably the soundest basis for the difference in the decisions is
that in the animal cases the party suffering the loss consequent upon the
mistaken action of the officer had no hearing and much worse had no
opportunity for a hearing either at his own instigation or one instituted
99. Idaho is not in accord with the weight of authority. State v. American Surety Co.,
26 Idaho 652, 145 Pac. 1097 (1914) and State v. T. G. & S. Co., 27 Idaho 752, 152 Pac. 189
(1915) where liability was imposed against the bank commissioners. This is probably due to
the wording of the statute in Idaho which makes it the "duty" of the banking commis-
sioneer ". . . to take charge of such bank or trust company. . . ." Also, New York seems
not to be in accord with general rule. See Walker v. Broderick, 141 Misc. 391, 52 N. Y.
Supp. 559 (Sup. Ct. 1931) and Veatch v. Broderick, 146 Misc. 848, 262 N. Y. Supp. 295
(Sup. Ct. 1932). In the Walker case the complaint charged negligence in omission and com-
mission. As to the former, the court indicated that a duty was owed only to the public,
but as to the latter, the court recognized an action might lie. These decisions were not
appealed.
100. Other banking control cases are: Gormley v. State, 54 Ga. App. 843, 189 S. E.
288 (1936); State v. Turner, 328 Mo. 604, 42 S. W. (2d) 594 (1931). Morrill County v.
Bliss, 125 Neb. 97, 249 N. W. 98 (1933) ; State ex rel. Robinson v. Farmer's State Bank,
162 Tenn. 499, 39 S. W. (2d) 281 (1931).
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by the officer. 10' The action is sudden and summary. However, in the
banking cases if the depositor or creditor of the bank desires seizure of
the bank he may institute proceedings to obtain it. It may be argued in
the animal cases, that the citizen can obtain an injunction against the
act of the officer. But the rapid action, necessary and proper on the part
of the officer, defeats this possibility. To deny the citizen a cause of
action in these cases is to take property without any due process, judicial
or administrative.0 2
(3) School supervision. In the banking cases almost all of the states'
impose liability upon the officer if malice is shown. Are the officers
charged with school supervision liable for erroneous action, even if
malice or improper motive is shown? There is a conflict on this question,
but the weight of authority seems to deny liability, even though malice
or lack of proper motive is shown.'04
In Sweeney v. Young, 05 the plaintiff was dismissed from school for
bringing cider to a school function under a statute giving the school board
power to dismiss a pupil for gross misconduct. The defendants were
members of the school board together with other officials. The court did
not find gross misconduct, malice or improper motive and held the de-
fendant members of the board not liable. But the court stated that the
existence of malice or improper motive is not material on the issue of lia-
bility of the school officials. The following principle appears in the
opinion: "The public interest that public officers shall be free and fear-
less in the exercise of their judicial duties makes it of immaterial bearing
on their liability for their judicial acts whether or not they act from
good motives."'0 6
101. Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486, 20 Am. Rep. 431 (1873); Hanlon v. Partridge,
69 N. H. 88, 44 AUt. 807 (1897). The foregoing cases are voting cases, wherein the refusal
of the right to vote, occurring, as it does, at the very last minute, will not permit of any
judicial remedy. In some states judges are assigned for active duty and available to imme-
diately pass upon these questions.
102. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 165, 131 At. 155, 159 (1925) wherein the court
referred to there being "no opportunity to right the wrong by legal proceedings in
season."
103. Note 99, supra.
104. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 Atl. 155 (1925); Speyer v. Denver, 82 Colo.
534, 261 Pac. 859 (1927). But see Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, 27 Amer. Rep. 343
(1877); Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402, 49 Am. Dec. 463 (1848); Dawkins v. Billingsley,
69 Okla. 257, 172 Pac. 69 (1918).
105. 82 N. H. 159, 131 AUt. 155.
106. Id. at 165, 131 At. at 158.
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However, in Speyer v. Denver,117 the court, in overruling the defend-
ant's (school official's) demurrer to a complaint alleging malice in the
making of a regulation requiring students to eat all lunches upon the
school premises, wrote:
"It may be conceded .. . that a public officer hates a person and may
be glad to see him suffer, as a consequence of that officer's official act,
is not enough to justify interference by the courts, and that if the rule
is a reasonable one and is made in good faith for the good of the schools
and pupils it is no consequence that it injures the plaintiff's enterprises
or that defendants are glad that it does so; but when, as is here alleged,
the officers act in bad faith, with malice, and from no purpose or motive
except to injure another, the case is different."'0 8 Thus this court recog-
nized a cause of action where an act lacked inherent merit and was
based entirely upon improper motives. In the Sweeney case, the absolute
immunity granted to the judiciary was extended to quasi-judicial offi-
cers."°9 In the Speyer case the court refused to extend the absolute im-
munity to quasi-judicial officers.""
The school-control cases are to be distinguished from the diseased-
animal cases in that in the former group there is an opportunity to right
the wrong before any great harm is done. The court recognized this in
the Sweeney case mentioning that malice might be material in cases
where there would be "no opportunity to right the wrong in season.""'
(4) Enforcement of criminal law. In these cases absolute immunity
is usually". granted," 3 for acts done in the furtherance of the prosecu-
tion.1 4 In Cooper v. O'Connor"5 the court refused to impose liability
107. 82 Colo. 534, 261 Pac. 859 (1927).
108. Speyer v. Denver, 82 Colo. 534, 538, 261 Pac. 859, at 861.
109. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 165, 131 At. 158 wherein the court wrote: "Judicial
acts do not lose their character as such because malice induces them,
110. See Speyer v. Denver, 82 Colo. 534, 538, 261 Pac. 859, 861.
111. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 Atl. 155, 159 (1925).
112. The federal rule grants absolute immunity. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135
and most of the states give the prosecutor complete immunity, even though malice is
shown. See Note, The Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-Judicial Acts, 275,
73 U. PA. LAW REv. 300.
113. Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 Fed.
Supp. 367 (D. C. S. D. Fla., 1933).
114. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135, 141. Blackstone wrote: ... it would be a very
great discouragement to public justice of the kingdom, if prosecutors, who had a tolerable
ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law whenever their indictment miscarried."
3 BL. COMM. (13th ed. 1800) 126.
115. 99 F. (2d) 135.
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against the prosecutor even though malice was present. 16 In these cases
a very liberal test is applied in determining whether the officer was acting
within his jurisdiction at the time of the performance of the acts forming
the gravamen of the complaint." 7 This immunity has been carried over
into cases where complainants press charges before administrative quasi-
judicial bodies." This grant of immunity to prosecutors rests soundly
upon the necessity that they, above all officers, must be free and fearless
in the exercise of their duties. This absolute immunity granted to actual
judges and prosecutors has, in our federal courts, been extended to the
heads of the federal executive departments, such as the Postmaster Gen-
eral," 9 the Secretary of the Treasury -'2 ° and an Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury,:2 ' the members of the U. S. Parole Board'22 the Warden of
the Federal Penitentiary 2 ' and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,124
the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 2 5 the chairman of the
Tariff Commission,' 26 the U. S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 27 and the
Chief of Record and Pension Office of the War Department 2 The im-
munity has now been extended to subordinates in the federal depart-
ments.'29 This would seem necessary if the immunity is to have any ap-
preciable application, 30 since the great bulk of the work of each depart-
ment must be delegated to subordinates.
116. In the Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 13S, 140, the court wrote, in dealing with
the question of liability of prosecuting officers: " . . it is, now generally recognized that,
as applied to some officers, at least, even the absence of probable- cause and the presence of
malice or other bad motive are not sufficient to impose liability upon such an officer who
acts within the general scope of his authority."
117. United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223 (1914); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d)
135 (App. D. C. 1938); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. (2d) 557 (App.
D. C. 1934); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896).
118. Sweeney v. Young, 82 N. H. 159, 131 Ad. 155 (1925) the court extended absolute
immunity to superintendent and head master of the school who preferred charges against
the plaintiff which resulted in his dismissal.
119. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896).
120. Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F. (2d) 168 (App. D. C., 1927).
121. Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F. (2d) 557.
122. Lang v. Wood, 92 F. (2d) 211 (App. D. C., 1937).
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Brown v. Rudolph, 25 F. (2d) 540 (App. D. C., 1928).
126. Smith v. O'Brien, 88 F. (2d) 769 (App. D. C., 1937).
127. Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413 (1912).







In text books131 and in judicial opinions 132 upon the subject, there
appears the broad all-inclusive statement, that the doctrine of respondeat
superior has no application to public officers in the performance of public
duties. It has been written that "Public officers of the government,
in the performance of their public functions, are not liable to third per-
sons for the misconduct, negligence or omissions of their official sub-
ordinates."' 3 Seemingly, the most cogent reason for the rule of non-
derivative liability rests upon the lack of that control exercised by a
master over his servant or a principal over his agent, which is funda-
mentally required, in order that the principle of respondeat superior
be properly applied. The subordinates in government offices are fre-
quently appointed directly by one, having the appointing power, who is
not their immediate superior. They are also usually removable at the
pleasure of the appointing power. Civil Service Acts impinge upon the
control a superior officer might otherwise have over his subordinates.
But it has been held that no derivative liability will be imposed even
though the superior officer has the power of appointment and removal.3
The power of appointment and removal when it is given to the immediate
superior is sometimes merely ostensible.
Damage caused by the negligence of subordinates during the construc-
tion of a highway and death or injury caused by the maintenance of
defective conditions upon school premises are typical cases wherein the
general rule denying liability is applied. In Strickfaden v. Green Creek
Highway District,'35 the court relieved a highway commissioner of deriva-
tive liability when it was not shown that he was careless in selecting the
subordinate and when it was not shown that he had participated in the
negligence. In Antin v. Union High School District,36 the court held that
the principle of respondeat superior has no application where school offi-
cers used reasonable care in selecting the subordinates and had no actual
knowledge of the negligent condition themselves. Knowledge of defec-
131. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1502.
132. Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507, 515 (1887).
133. 1 MECHEM, 10C. cit. supra note 131.
134. Keenan v. Southworth, 110 Mass. 474 (1872).
135. 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926).
136. 130 Ore. 461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929).
[Vol. 12
PERSONAL TORT LIABILITY
tive conditions, existing upon public premises, on the part of subordinates
is not imputed to their superiors.8 7
The general rule, that a public officer is not liable for the misconduct,
negligence or omissions of his subordinates in the performance of their
public duties has several exceptions: (1) Where the acts of the sub-
ordinate cause the loss of public money received into the actual or con-
structive custody of the superior officer; 138 (2) where the superior has
merely ministerial duties; 139 (3) where negligence is shown in the selec-
tion of a subordinate; 140 (4) where the act done by the subordinate which
is the basis of the complaint is not done in the performance of a public
duty;"' (5) where the officer had knowledge of, encouraged, or par-
ticipated in the negligence.2
The second exception set out above is the only genuine exception; the
others are much more apparent than real. A brief consideration of them,
will, it is submitted, reveal this. The liability imposed upon a superior
officer for public money received in his office is an insurer's liability;
143
it is not a derivative liability. It is imposed even though the loss was not
caused by the fault of any subordinate. The rigidity of this rule has been
relieved to some extent by statute 44 So also an officer is not liable for
losses occurring during the term of his predecessor. 48
The second exception imposes liability upon an officer, charged with
merely ministerial duties, for the negligence of his subordinates. In
Fisher v. Levy14 6 a recording officer was held liable derivatively for the
negligence of a subordinate, in failing to detect forgery in an instrument
purporting to be a cancellation of an existing mortgage. The plaintiff
purchased it as unencumbered property, as the record showed, when in
137. Strickfaden v. Green Creek Highway District, 42 Idaho 738, -248 Pac. 456 (1926).
138. Bird v. McGoldrick, 277 N. Y. 492, 14 N. E. (2d) 805 (1938).
139. Fisher v. Levy, 180 La. 195, 156 So. 220 (1934).
140. Strickfaden v. Green Creek Highway Dist., 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926);
Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535, 269 Pac. 425 (1928).
141. Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83, 10 At. 499 (1886).
142. Herman v. Board of Education, 234 N. Y. 196, 137 N. E. 24 (1922); Mokovick v.
Independent School Dist., 177 Minn. 446, 225 N. W. 292 (1929).
143. Under the English rule the public officer who suffers the loss of public funds
received by him has only "bailee" liability, which requires proof of negligence before
it is imposed. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 91 Eng. Rep. R. 1332 (K. B. 1701).
144. See such statutes applied in Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123 (1876); Imp. Dist.
v. North Arkansas Highway, 168 Ark. 220, 270 S. W. 533 (1925).
145. Gerschon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 276 N. Y. 53, 11 N. E. (2d) 349 (1937); Pfeffer v.
Lehmann, 255 App. Div. 220, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 275 (2d Dep't 1938).
146. 180 La. 195, 156 So. 220 (1934).
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fact it was subject to a mortgage.147 This matter is sometimes covered
by statute. 48 It is a genuine exception and these recording cases are
sometimes cited as holding that derivative liability will be imposed where
a mere ministerial duty is present. 49 Included with the recording cases
in establishing this exception to the general rule are cases wherein deriva-
tive liability was imposed upon court clerks and sheriffs.'
The liability based upon negligence in selection' 51 of subordinates is
not derivative. It is based upon the actual negligence of the superior
officer himself, rather than upon the negligence of the subordinate.
The fourth named exception'52 is really excluded by the rule itself,
since the rule is limited to the performance of a public duty, either ex-
pressly' 13 or impliedly, as distinguished from this group of cases, where
the negligent act is done by a subordinate in the performance of a private
duty. The last division, wherein liability is imposed if the officer had
knowledge of,. encouraged, or participated in the negligence,' 54 is an exam-
ple of direct rather than of vicarious liability. It is based upon the com-
mission or omission of the superior officer himself. This is not a genuine
exception to the general rule, which refuses to impose derivative liability
upon the public officer. While this rule is just because of the superior
officer's lack of control, public service might be improved if liability
was imposed.
147. See Whalen v. Reynolds, 101 Minn. 290, 112 N. W. 223 (1907); Watkins v. Simonds,
202 N. C. 746, 164 S. E. 363 (1932).
148. In Maxwell v. Stuart, 99 Tenn. 409, 42 S. W. 34 (1897) a statute, rendering the
clerk liable only where a wilful violation could be shown was involved. See also Bishop v.
Schneider, 46 Mo. 472, 2 Am. Rep. 533 (1870).
149. See I MECHEF, op. cit. supra note 131 § 1505.
150. Harrington v. Fuller, 18 Me. 277, 36 Am. Dec. 719 (1841); Norton v. Nye,
56 Me. 211 (1868); Prosser v. Coots, 50 Mich. 262, 15 N. W. 448 (1883).
151. Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535, 269 Pac. 425 (1928); Antin v. Union High School
Dist., 130 Ore. 461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929), note (1930) 66 A. L. R. 1271, 1281.
152. Ely v. Parsons, 55 Conn. 83, 10 AtI. 499 (1886); Central R. R. & Banking Co.
v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 357, 52 Am. Rep. 334 (1884).
153. See Strickfaden v. Green Creek Highway District, 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926).
154. Antin v. Union High School Dist., 130 Ore. 461, 280 Pac. 664 (1929); Veatch v.
Broderick, 146 Misc. 848, 262 N. Y. Supp. 295 (1932).
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